The Subject Before the Law Consciousness of the Moral Law and Faktum of Reason in Kant
Published 2018-06-08
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Abstract
In this work, we shall analyze two aspects regarding what Kant considers the fundamental principle of practical reason. First, we shall try to show that the fundamental practical prin-ciple necessarily implies a sort of suspension of any subjective principle of action, that is, of the guiding function proper to maxims. This would be a first moment of negativity inherent to the consciousness of the Moral law within us. Secondly, we shall also attempt to show that the consciousness of this law in-volves the recognition of our original inadequacy with respect to it, and that this inadequacy is necessarily felt as a peculiar type of pain, a negative feeling as unique and original as it is unique and original the fact of the law ́s consciousness. This would be a second moment of negativity, this time related to the agent’s own practical identity.
References
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