Número 17 - 1999
Articles

Sophitical Reasoning (Private) and the Theory of Predicables

José Miguel Gambra
Universidad de Bari

Published 2013-11-28

How to Cite

Gambra, J. M. (2013). Sophitical Reasoning (Private) and the Theory of Predicables. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, 17(1), 33–69. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v17i1.368

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Abstract

The Aristotelian doctrine of fallacies found in the Sophistical Refutations cannot be understood without referring to the Topics. In this paper we attempt to show that, in this last work, there is an implicit "logic of predicables", which can explain in a very convincing way some of those fallacies, like those of accident, of consequent, secundum quid ad simpliciter and babbling. At the same time, we present the main ingredients of this logic and we discuss some modern solutions to those sophisms.

References

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