Número 47 - 2014
Articles

The Sorites Meets the Many

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  • Ricardo Mena
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i47.665

Published 2014-12-07

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How to Cite

Mena, R. (2014). The Sorites Meets the Many. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (47), 139–158. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i47.665
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Abstract

The objective of this paper is to understand certain issues that come up once we recognize that a good number of natural language predicates are indeterminate in two different ways. For example, the predicate ’is a mountain’ is both vague and susceptible to the problem of the many. Throughout the paper I focus on how to distinguish these two kinds of indeterminacy, and on a certain problem that supervaluationism has when it is recognized that a single predicate can be vague and susceptible to the problem of the many. The problem is that supervaluationism loses its ability to capture our intuitions concerning sharp cut-offs. Finally, I offer a solution to this problem.
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