N.º 74 (2026): Número en curso
Artículos

De la forma general de la proposición al problema Frege-Geach en el Tractatus

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  • Javier Vidal
Javier Vidal
Universidad de Concepción
Biografia

Publicado 2025-09-30

Palavras-chave

  • aserción,
  • forma general de la proposición,
  • proposición,
  • proposiciones-caso,
  • proposiciones-tipo,
  • pro-oración,
  • constantes lógicas,
  • problema Frege-Geach,
  • Wittgenstein,
  • Tractatus
    • ...Mais
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Direitos de Autor (c) 2025 Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía

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Este trabalho encontra-se publicado com a Licença Internacional Creative Commons Atribuição-NãoComercial-SemDerivações 4.0.

Como Citar

Vidal, J. (2025). De la forma general de la proposición al problema Frege-Geach en el Tractatus. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, 74, 11-43. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v740.3019
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Resumo

Este artículo desarrolla, primero, la idea de que, según el Tractatus de Wittgenstein, la aserción es un aspecto de la forma misma de las proposiciones que podría representarse mediante una pro-oración. Se sugiere entonces una nueva formulación del problema Frege-Geach, dado el carácter asertivo inherente a las proposiciones. A partir, por un lado, de una distinción entre proposiciones-caso y proposiciones-tipo, y, por otro lado, de la concepción de las constantes lógicas como operaciones, presento finalmente una posible solución tractariana al problema Frege-Geach en esa nueva versión.

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