No. 74 (2026): Número en curso
Articles

From the General Propositional Form to the Frege-Geach Problem in the Tractatus

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  • Javier Vidal
Javier Vidal
Universidad de Concepción
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Published 2025-09-30

Keywords

  • assertion,
  • general propositional form,
  • proposition,
  • token-propositions,
  • type-propositions,
  • pro-sentence,
  • logical constants,
  • Frege-Geach problem,
  • Wittgenstein,
  • Tractatus
    • ...More
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How to Cite

Vidal, J. (2025). From the General Propositional Form to the Frege-Geach Problem in the Tractatus. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, 74, 11-43. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v740.3019
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Abstract

This paper develops the idea that, according to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, assertion is an aspect of the very form of propositions that could be represented by means of a pro-sentence. Then, given the assertive character inherent to propositions, a new formulation of the Frege-Geach problem is suggested. Drawing on a distinction between token-propositions and type-propositions, as well as on the conception of logical constants as operations, I ultimately present a possible Tractarian solution to this version of the Frege-Geach problem.

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