Número 44 - 2013
Artículos

Trading One Kind of Dogmatism for Another: Comments on Williams' Criticism of Aggripan Scepticism

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  • Armando Cíntora,
  • Jorge Ornelas
Armando Cíntora
Departamento de Filosofía, UAM-Iztapalapa
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i44.1

Publicado 2013-09-30

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Cíntora, A., & Ornelas, J. (2013). Trading One Kind of Dogmatism for Another: Comments on Williams’ Criticism of Aggripan Scepticism. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (44), 9–34. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i44.1
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Se discute el análisis de M. Williams (1999, 2001 and 2004b) de la Concepción de la Fundamentación Previa de la justificación epistémica (CFP) –una concepción supuestamente detrás del trilema de Agripa– y se le contrasta con la Concepción del Desafío por Defecto (CDD) – la concepción alternativa de la justificación epistémica propugnada por Williams. Se argumenta que los privilegios epistémicos predeterminados de la CDD son un eufemismo para estipulaciones epistémicamente arbitrarias, asimismo se argumenta que mientras el CFP puede conducir a paradojas escépticas, la CDD conduce a un pancriticismo paradójico y que cuál de estas dos paradojas preferir es un asunto de gusto o temperamento. Finalmente se arguye que la CDD no es ni una adecuada descripción de nuestra práctica filosófica, ni tampoco de nuestra práctica epistémica cotidiana. Se concluye entonces que la CFP es la concepción superior, aun si pudiese conducir al escepticismo pirrónico. Concluimos argumentando abiertamente en favor de un tipo de dogmatismo no epistémico con implicaciones pirrónicas para las presuposiciones absolutas de la ciencia (algunos de los dogmas serían por ejemplo, criterios de evidencia adecuada, criterios de creencia racional, criterios de acción racional, criterios de metas deseables, etc.) Estas consecuencias, sin embargo, no tienen por qué ser incompatibles con la investigación científica.

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