No. 54 (2018): Enero - junio
Articles

Are the Formal (or Logical) Concepts Ontological Categories?

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  • Sergio Mota
Sergio Mota
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i54.905

Published 2017-11-11

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Mota, S. (2017). Are the Formal (or Logical) Concepts Ontological Categories?. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (54), 301–331. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i54.905
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Abstract

The main aim of this paper is to try to give an answer to the question whether or not the formal concepts of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus are ontological categories. My answer is that ‘they are not’. Thus, after presenting a definition of ‘ontology’ (§2), and different readings of the initial propositions of the Tractatus (§3), I present the notion of formal or logical concept, as well as different interpretations with regard to the role of these concepts in the Tractatus (§4). Later, and bearing in mind what has been said in the previous sections, I give (I) my own reading of the initial propositions in terms of conceptual or grammatical expressions, (II) the distinction both in extension and in intension between the notions of formal or logical concept and ontological category, and (III) the dissolution of ontology, but not of logic (§5). Lastly, I present the final conclusions that summarize the core aspects of the preceding discussion (§6).
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