No. 54 (2018): Enero - junio
Articles

An Explanation of Psychological SelfKnowledge

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  • Javier Vidal
Javier Vidal
Universidad de Concepción
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i54.858

Published 2017-11-11

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How to Cite

Vidal, J. (2017). An Explanation of Psychological SelfKnowledge. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (54), 353–392. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i54.858
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Abstract

Following C. Peacocke’s approach, I will develop an explanation of psychological self-knowledge in terms of the states and contents involved in the transition from a conscious mental state to a higher-order judgement. Now, it seems that the mere awareness of a mental state does not explicitly represent or in any way manifest the subject of that state, in which case it poses an à la Lichtenberg challenge to Peacocke’s explanation. After embracing a self-representational theory of the subjective character of experience, I will argue that the representation through which a conscious experience represents itself as itself has an implicit de se content. Thus it is an explanation which precludes an à la Lichtenberg challenge because the use of the first-person in a higher-order judgement turns out to be content-dependent
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