No. 53 (2017): Julio-diciembre
Articles

The Starting Point, Assumptions and Scope of the Kantian Refutation of Idealism

Matías Oroño
Universidad de Buenos Aires-CONICET
Bio

Published 2017-07-01

How to Cite

Oroño, M. (2017). The Starting Point, Assumptions and Scope of the Kantian Refutation of Idealism. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (53), 229. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i53.820

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Abstract

In this paper I shall provide an interpretation of the Kantian argument of the ‘Refutation of Idealism’ in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. On the one hand, I hold that the argument takes as its starting point a minimum premise that is shared with the Cartesian idealist. However, in the development of the argument Kant appeals to premises that are not necessarily accepted by the Cartesian idealist. On the other hand, I afirm that the argument only is able to demonstrate that the internal experience assumes the existence of something permanent in general, but it is insuficient to determine whether in a given case I have something really existing in space or merely imaginary. I conclude that the argument only satisfies its antisceptical function if it is regarded as a piece belonging to the systematic corpus of Kantian criticism.

 

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