Published 2014-06-27
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Abstract
An adequate theory of knowledge attribution sentences must face the Cartesian Skeptical Challenge. Epistemic Contextualism offers an attractive solution to the problem. This is considered to be one of its principal virtues. However, as soon as we ask for more clarity and precision we face some difficulties. I briefly recall some non-promising versions of Contextualism, already exposed by DeRose, and I introduce his own improved account, designed to avoid them. I argue that DeRose improved account fails to solve the problems that threatened earlier versions of Contextualism. The advocate of Contextualism must explain us how we are supposed to implement his anti-skeptical strategy.
References
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