Número 43 - 2012
Articles

Akrasia and Ordinary Weakness of Will

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  • Lubomira Radoilska
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i43.31

Published 2013-11-26

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How to Cite

Radoilska, L. (2013). Akrasia and Ordinary Weakness of Will. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (43), 25–50. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i43.31
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Abstract

This article offers an account of akrasia as a primary failure of intentional agency in contrast to a recent account of weakness of will, developed by Richard Holton, that also points to a kind of failure of intentional agency but presents this as both separate from akrasia and more fundamental than it. Drawing on Aristotle’s work, it is argued that the failure of intentional agency articulated by the concept of akrasia is the central case, whereas the phenomenon Holton’s account is after, referred to as ‘ordinary weakness of will’, is best understood as an unsuccessful attempt to tackle akrasia and, more specifically, a secondary failure of intentional agency.

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