Número 22 - 2002
Articles

The Aporia of Action in Davidson

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  • Javier Vidal
Javier Vidal
Universidad Panamericana
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v22i1.305

Published 2013-11-28

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How to Cite

Vidal, J. (2013). The Aporia of Action in Davidson. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, 22(1), 95–111. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v22i1.305
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Abstract

Based on the Davidsonian analysis of the notion of action, this paper attempts to show the difference between action as caused by an agent and action as intentionally described. So, on one hand, in the level of being there is not a class of actions which is the particular class of intentional actions; but, on the other hand, in the level of saying there is not a class of actions which is not the particular class of intentional actions: paradoxically, the only class of actions includes actions as caused by an agent, but, as such, the actions cannot be described.

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