Ser y llegar a ser

Abstract

This paper attempts to compare two distinct interpretations of the relation between a capacity and its corresponding actuality in Physics III. The author focuses on the legitimacy of a distinction between “capacity of being” and “capacities of becoming”. This distinction is applied to the interpretation of Aristotle’s definition of movement. Mittelmann discusses the circularity that appears to turn out from an appeal to “dynamic capacities”; then he intends to show that the alternative way to construct Aristotle’s position by referring to the incomplete actualization of “capacities of being” yields some counter-intuitive consequences. The paper finishes by pointing out that both strategies lead to an alternative: either Aristotle’s definition of movement must be accepted without objections (running the risk of making such a definition inapplicable to a set of phenomena it is supposed to account for) or it must be corrected in the sense suggested by W. D. Ross, but taking the chance of making the definition circular.