No. 60 (2021): January - June
Articles

Seeing as We Cannot

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  • Carlos Alejandro Postlethwaite
Carlos Alejandro Postlethwaite
Graduate Center, City University of New York
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i60.1118

Published 2020-10-27

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How to Cite

Postlethwaite, C. A. (2020). Seeing as We Cannot. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (60), 75–102. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i60.1118
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Abstract

The belief that Jastrow’s duck-rabbit (J) is both a duck-head and a rabbit-head drawing violates the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC), as does the belief that J seems to be something independent of all the ways J can seem. Call the former belief B1 and the latter B2. I argue that B1 and B2 are rational, though contradictory beliefs, and conclude that we must reassess the LNC’s status of being a fundamental requirement for rationality. In contrast with B1 and B2, our experiences that correspond to said beliefs do comply with the LNC. That is: we cannot see J as both duck and rabbit at the same time (E1), nor does J seem something independent of the ways J can seem (E2). Since there is no satisfactory explanation for why we are not able to see J as the contradictions E1 or E2―even though our corresponding beliefs about J are the contradictions B1 and B2―I propose that the LNC is merely an empirical hypothesis concerning the limits of our perception.

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