No. 58 (2020): January - June
Articles

Conceptualism and Contradictory Experiences

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  • Nicolás Alejandro Serrano
Nicolás Alejandro Serrano
Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA) Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i58.1075

Published 2019-12-13

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How to Cite

Serrano, N. A. (2019). Conceptualism and Contradictory Experiences. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (58), 259–289. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i58.1075
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Abstract

In this paper I provide a conceptualist answer to Crane’s (1988a; 1988b) waterfall illusion argument in the representationalist debate about the type of content of perceptual experience. First, I analyze the general structure of the argument, according to which the putatively contradictory content of certain optical illusions shows that perceptual experiences have non-conceptual content. Second, I discuss some conceptualist answers to the argument in order to show why they are not satisfactory. Finally, I offer a conceptualist answer, that I call “dissociative”, according to which the content of the waterfall illusion is not actually contradictory.

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