No. 58 (2020): January - June
Articles

Not-being, Falsehood and Contradiction: the Second Eristic Demonstration of the Euthydemus and the Problem of the False in the Sophist

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  • Francisco Villar
Francisco Villar
Universidad de Buenos Aires - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i58.1061

Published 2019-12-13

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How to Cite

Villar, F. (2019). Not-being, Falsehood and Contradiction: the Second Eristic Demonstration of the Euthydemus and the Problem of the False in the Sophist. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (58), 11–37. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i58.1061
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Abstract

This work proposes an interpretation of Euthydemus 283c-288b taking into account the problem of the false in the Sophist. My hypothesis will be that the second eristic demonstration of the Euthydemus can be understood as a representation of Sophist 236d-239b: while in this passage there it is the Stranger is the one who states what the sophist would say to defend himself from the seventh definition, in which he is accused of producing falsehoods, in the Euthydemus two sophists are who use the notions of non-being and falsehood to refute such accusation. The work has three parts. Firstly, I shall analyze Sophist 236d-239b and contextualize it within the framework of the seventh definition. Secondly, I focus on the characterization of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus as sophists. Finally, I analyze the three arguments that organize the second demonstration of the Euthydemus, trying to understand its structure and its role in the drama of the dialogue.

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