N.º 59 (2020): Julio-diciembre
Artículos

The Affective and the Political: Rousseau and Contemporary Kantianism

Byron Matthew Davies
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas (IIF), Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
##plugins.themes.classic.biography##

Publicado 2020-06-27

Como Citar

Davies, B. M. (2020). The Affective and the Political: Rousseau and Contemporary Kantianism. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (59), 301–339. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i59.1110

Downloads

Não há dados estatísticos.

Altmetrics

Citas

Resumo

Jean-Jacques Rousseau is often associated with a certain political mode of relating to another, where a person (“a Citizen”) is a locus of enforceable demands. I claim that Rousseau also articulated an affective mode of relating to another, where a person is seen as the locus of a kind of value (expressive of their being an independent point of view) that cannot be demanded. These are not isolated sides of a distinction, for the political mode constitutes a solution to certain problems that the affective mode encounters in common social circumstances, allowing us to see how these modes might be distinct while the political nevertheless shapes the affective. I contrast this approach with that of some contemporary Kantian writers on affective phenomena (Sarah Buss on shame, and J. David Velleman on love) who, for reasons rooted in Kant’s moral philosophy, have modeled affective ways of relating to others on duty. I claim that Rousseau’s writing provides us with a way of capturing the correct insight of these accounts—that some of our emotional responses to others are ways of appreciating their personhood—while avoiding the characteristic implausibilities of their close association between the affective and the political.

Referências

  1. Althusser, L. (1970). Politics and History: Montesquieu, Rousseau, Marx. B. Brewster (trans.), NLB.
  2. Bertram, C. (2004). Rousseau and The Social Contract. Routledge.
  3. Brooke, C. (2010). Rousseau’s Second Discourse: between Epicureanism and Stoicism. In C. McDonald and S. Hoffman (eds.), Rousseau and Freedom. (pp. 44-57). Cambridge University Press.
  4. Brooke, C. (2016). ‘The porch to a Collectivism as Absolute as the Mind of Man Has Ever Conceived’: Rousseau Scholarship in Britain from the Great War to the Cold War. In A. Lifeschitz (ed.), Engaging with Rousseau. (pp. 136-151). Cambridge University Press.
  5. Buss, S. (1999). Respect for Persons. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 29, 517-550.
  6. Cavell, S. (1994). A Pitch of Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
  7. Cohen, J. (2010). Rousseau: A Free Community of Equals. Oxford University Press.
  8. Darwall, S. (2015, April 06). Second-Personal Attitudes of the Heart. PEA Soup. Retrieved December 28, 2019, from http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2015/04/second-personal-attitudes-of-the-heart-byfeatured-philosopher-steve-darwall.html.
  9. Davies, B. (2019). Speech, the Affective, and the Insult in Not Being Believed: Rousseau and Adam Smith. The Adam Smith Review, 11, 53-66.
  10. Davies, B. (2018). Individuality and Mortality in the Philosophy of PortraitPainting: Simmel, Rousseau, and Melanie Klein. Contrastes. Revista Internacional de Filosofía 23, 27-52.
  11. Davies, B. (unpublished MS). Amour-Propre and Seeing Others as Persons. Della Volpe, G. (1970). The Marxist Critique of Rousseau. The New Left Review, 59, 101-109.
  12. Dent, N. J. H. (1988). Rousseau: An Introduction to His Psychological, Social, and Political Theory. Blackwell.
  13. Dent, N. J. H. (1992). A Rousseau Dictionary. Blackwell.
  14. Dent, N. J. H. (2005). Rousseau. Routledge.
  15. Ebels-Duggan, K. (2008). Against Beneficence: A Normative Account of Love. Ethics, 119, 142-170.
  16. Dent, N. J. H. (2019). Beyond Words: Inarticulable Reasons and Reasonable Commitments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 98, 623-641.
  17. Dent, N. J. H. (forthcoming). Love, Respect, and the Value of Humanity. In N. Theunissen and S. Buss (eds.), The Value of Humanity: A Re-Evaluation. Oxford University Press.
  18. Feinberg, J. (1970). The Nature and Value of Rights. The Journal of Value Inquiry, 4, 243-260.
  19. Fix, J. D. (2020). The Error Condition. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 50(1), 34-48.
  20. Hasan, R. (2016). Autonomy and Happiness in Rousseau’s Justification of the State. The Review of Politics, 78, 391-417.
  21. Herman, B. (2007). Moral Literacy. Harvard University Press.
  22. Irwin, T. (2008). The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study. 3 vols. Oxford University Press.
  23. James, D. (2013). Rousseau and German Idealism: Freedom, Dependence and Necessity. Cambridge University Press.
  24. Kant, I. (1996). The Metaphysics of Morals. M. Gregor (trans.), Cambridge
  25. University Press.
  26. Kant, I. (1997a). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. M. Gregor (trans.), Cambridge University Press.
  27. Kant, I. (1997b). Critique of Practical Reason. M. Gregor (trans.), Cambridge University Press.
  28. Kant, I. (1998). Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. A. Wood and G. di Giovanni (trans.), Cambridge University Press.
  29. Korsgaard, C. M. (1997). Introduction to Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge University Press.
  30. Lavin, D. (forthcoming). Rousseau’s Conscience in Modern Moral Philosophy. In J. Conant and S. Rödl (eds.), Practical Reason: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. De Gruyter Verlag.
  31. Levine, A. (1993). The General Will: Rousseau, Marx, Communism. Cambridge University Press.
  32. Marx, K. (1975). Letter from Marx to Sigfrid Meyer and August Vogt. In Selected Correspondence of Marx and Engels. (pp. 220-224). Progress Publishers.
  33. Murdoch, I. (1997). The Sublime and the Good. In Peter Conradi (ed.), Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and Literature. (pp. 205-220). Penguin.
  34. Neuhouser, F. (1993). Freedom, Dependence, and the General Will. The Philosophical Review, 102, 363-395.
  35. Neuhouser, F. (2008). Rousseau’s Theodicy of Self-Love: Evil, Rationality, and the Drive for Recognition. Oxford University Press.
  36. Neuhouser, F. (2014). Rousseau’s Critique of Inequality: Reconstructing the Second Discourse. Cambridge University Press. Plamenatz, J. (1963). Man and Society: A Critical Examination of Some Important Social and Political Theories from Machiavelli to Marx. 2 vols. Longmans.
  37. Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press.
  38. Rawls, J. (2008). Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy. S. Freeman (ed.), Harvard University Press.
  39. Ripstein, A. (2009). Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
  40. Sartre, J.-P. (1956). Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. H. E. Barnes (trans.), Washington Square Press.
  41. Setiya, K. (2014). Love and the Value of a Life. The Philosophical Review, 123, 251-280.
  42. Setiya, K. (unpublished MS). Other People.
  43. Shklar, J. (1969). Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory. Cambridge University Press.
  44. Starobinski, J. (1988). Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction. A. Goldhammer (trans.), University of Chicago Press.
  45. Starobinski, J. (1989). Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Peril of Reflection. In The Living Eye. A. Goldhammer (trans.), (pp. 14-77). Harvard University Press.
  46. Taylor, C. (1975). Hegel. Cambridge University Press.
  47. Velleman, J. D. (1999). Love as a Moral Emotion. Ethics, 109, 338-374.
  48. Velleman, J. D. (2008). Beyond Price. Ethics, 118, 191-212.