N.º 59 (2020): Julio-diciembre
Artículos

Filosofía, análisis y juegos: el inútil intento de definir las cosas

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  • Sebastián Briceño Domínguez
Sebastián Briceño Domínguez
Departamento de Filosofía, Universidad de Concepción (Chile)
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i59.1074

Publicado 2020-06-27

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Briceño Domínguez, S. (2020). Filosofía, análisis y juegos: el inútil intento de definir las cosas. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (59), 121–151. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i59.1074
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Resumo

Según McGinn (2012), el fin de la filosofía es descubrir esencias mediante el análisis conceptual, y ella califica como un juego en el sentido de Suits (1978, 2014). Sin embargo, todo en la definición de juego de Suits parece dejar fuera de su alcance a la definición de filosofía de McGinn. Aquí someto a revisión crítica la definición de McGinn y propongo una más comprensiva. Incidentalmente, esta definición nos permitirá incluir a la filosofía dentro de la clase de actividades que sí satisfacen la definición de juego de Suits.

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