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The Deductions of Freedom/Morality-as-Autonomy and the Categorical Imperative in Groundwork III and Their Problems

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  • Fernando Rudy Hiller
Fernando Rudy Hiller
Stanford University
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DOI : https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i50.743

Publiée 2015-12-20

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Hiller, F. R. (2015). The Deductions of Freedom/Morality-as-Autonomy and the Categorical Imperative in Groundwork III and Their Problems. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (50), 61–94. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i50.743
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Résumé

The first objective of this paper is to present an interpretation of Groundwork III which aims to establish two main points: first, that Kant offers there a theoretically-grounded deduction (in Kantian sense) of freedom/morality-as-autonomy; second, that Kant also offers a separate deduction of the categorical imperative. Thus, contrary to what several commentators have claimed, Groundwork III contains a theoretically-grounded double deduction. The second objective of the paper is to examine and criticize in detail one crucial step in these deductions, namely, Kant’s inference from the speculative spontaneity of reason to the noumenal existence of the subject as a free will. I show that Kant himself came to reject this inference in the B edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, and argue that this explains Kant’s rejection, in the Critique of Practical Reason, of the deduction of the moral law he previously offered. Thus, contrary to the “reconciliationist” reading, there is indeed a great reversal in the latter work.
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Références

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