On the Genesis of the Sensible from the Intelligible

Abstract

It is well known Schelling’s critique of Fichte’s doctrine of science, to wit, that it would have annihilated every concept of a living nature, reducing it to a mere obstacle to be overcome for the realization of moral ends of reason. However, is Schelling right? This paper aims to refute Schelling’s critique, showing not only how the doctrine of science does not suffer from this deficiency, but also that instead it deducts from the structure of the reason the domains of knowledge, including, of course, the domain of nature. This deduction of the domains of knowledge, nature and spirit, will be made through the analysis of the passage-structure from Absolut to the factual knowledge, that is, the I’s reflection on himself, especially through the consideration of its Kantian elements: the practical spontaneity and its eminently reflective character, something that was not realized by Schelling and his followers.