El postulado de la inmortalidad del alma en la filosofía moral Kantiana: Parte I

Abstract

The aim of this article is to clarify the grounds of Kant’s practical postulate of the immortality of the soul. In order to do that, I discuss some passages of the Critique of Pure Reason, in which Kant explains the nature of antinomies and the reasons why these cannot be theoretically solved. After that, my next step will be to elucidate the connection in Kant’s philosophy between the moral law and the intelligible world. By doing so, I explore the arguments in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason that prove that there is a practical access to the intelligible world, which is banned to those who consider the problems of antinomies –specially, the problem of human freedom– solely from a theoretical standpoint. I then reconstruct Kant’s view about the nature of practical postulates. In this regard, my analysis will focus on the notion of moral progress, which is, according to Kant, the actual motive that prompts us human beings to suppose legitimately our enduring existence after death. Lastly, I discuss the problematic nature of the notion of moral progress –which implies temporality–, and try to provide some reasonable grounds as to why it is nevertheless sound and cogent within Kant’s system.