No. 50 (2016): Enero - junio
Articles

The First Rule of Stoic Logic and its Relationship with the Indemonstrables

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  • Miguel López Astorga
Miguel López Astorga
University of Talca
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i50.724

Published 2015-12-20

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Astorga, M. L. (2015). The First Rule of Stoic Logic and its Relationship with the Indemonstrables. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (50), 9–23. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i50.724
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Abstract

In addition to the indemonstrables, Stoic logic included a number of reduction rules. In this paper, I analyze the rst one of such rules in order to prove whether it was formally derived from the indemonstrables or the Stoics could raise it from the use of their natural reasoning abilities. Thus, I try to show that there are reasons to support both possibilities and, based on a semantic approach such as that of the mental models theory, to give arguments in this regard. 

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References

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