K. Popper: racionalismo crítico, metafísica y metodología de lo inverificable

Abstract

This paper offers a survey of a series of fundamental notions on the philosophy of Karl Popper that enable to understand the quid and the status of metaphysics towards the critiques of the Vienna Circle in a post-kantian epoch. Elemental concerns of the philosophy of science of Popper are traced out, highlighting the importance of kantian influence, the reformulation of critique as the rational process of testing and finding errors, the grievance of theories as interpretations of facts, the modification of traditional methodology, the dimenssions of compatibility and validity regarding scientific knowledge in is empirical or speculative flavors, among others. At the same time, it is pointed out a series of throughly philosophical errors, particularly regarding the inconcruity of vage and neglected use of language that Popper, formerly severe on this topic, employed. The paper concludes with an analysis of popperian metaphysics understood as a rational knowledge of a non-verifiable, non-refutable, yet argumentable type which belongs to the sphere of science, though in a special and subordinate way: as the methodology of the unverifiable.