Número 20 - 2001
Articles

Realism or Pragmatism? Rorty vs Taylor debate over the Implications of the Overcoming of Epistemology

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  • Daniel Kalpokas
Daniel Kalpokas
Universidad de Navarra
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v20i1.323

Published 2013-11-28

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How to Cite

Kalpokas, D. (2013). Realism or Pragmatism? Rorty vs Taylor debate over the Implications of the Overcoming of Epistemology. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, 20(1), 59–106. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v20i1.323
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Abstract

This paper analyses the discussion between Taylor and Rorty concerning the results derived from overcoming epistemology. First, the article summarizes Taylor's criticism against Rorty. Second, it considers the Rortyan response to Taylor and his own arguments against Taylor's realism. The main disagreements between Rorty and Taylor are the following: 1) Rorty states that pragmatism overcomes epistemology, whereas Taylor claims that it is an uncompromising realism which overcomes the mainstream epistemological tradition; 2) they disagree on how to understand vocabularies: Taylor claims that it is always possible to know what vocabulary better describes the world, while Rorty seems to claim that vocabularies are incommensurable; 3) Taylor thinks of truth as a corresponding relation with the world; Rorty, however, dismisses such conception. Third, an evaluation of the arguments offered by each side is done, particularly arguing against the Rortyan conception of language games and its non-realistic consequences. Finally, a reconsideration of the dichotomy realism-pragmatism is suggested.

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