Número 25 - 2003
Articles

Aristotle, Stoics, and Aristotelians: A Disputation on the Nature of Time and Change

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  • Ricardo Salles
Ricardo Salles
Brigham Young University
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v25i1.274

Published 2013-11-28

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How to Cite

Salles, R. (2013). Aristotle, Stoics, and Aristotelians: A Disputation on the Nature of Time and Change. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, 25(1), 47–57. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v25i1.274
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Abstract

A fundamental problem of philosophy of nature is addressed in this paper: is it possible for time to flow even if the changes that in fact go along with it did not exist? The two antique positions that are most recognized, the one of Aristotle and the one of the Stoics, are analyzed in this essay. On one hand, Aristotle’s definition of time is based on change, so his answer to the question here addressed would be negative; but, on the other hand, the Stoics argue that there are moments in which time truly flows without changes taking place, as the orthodox version of the Eternal Return states, and therefore time does not presupposes the notion of change. I here present the following hypothesis: the heterodox Stoics accepted the Aristotelian idea of time that presupposes change, an idea which they learnt from Eudemus, and that leads them to propose transcyclic changes in order to solve the problems generated by the discussion on individualization, identity and change through time.

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References

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