No. 60 (2021): January - June
Articles

On an Argument Against the Combination of De Re Modal Anti-Realism and Realism about Objects

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  • José Edgar González Varela
José Edgar González Varela
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i60.1166

Published 2020-10-27

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How to Cite

González Varela, J. E. (2020). On an Argument Against the Combination of De Re Modal Anti-Realism and Realism about Objects. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (60), 11–36. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i60.1166
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Abstract

Some philosophers think that anti-realism about de re necessity entails anti-realism about the individuation and identity of objects. In this paper I address one argument for this view, due to Sidelle (2010), according to which the only way in which a de re modal conventionalist can avoid being refuted by a well-known argument based on the contingency of conventions is by also accepting conventionalism about objects. I show that Sidelle’s argument is not successful and, in this way, I also show that the combination of de re modal anti-realism and realism about objects is at least not threatened from this direction.

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