No. 60 (2021): January - June
Articles

Dialogical Assertion as a Minimum Unit of Knowledge

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  • Rodrigo López-Orellana,
  • Juan Redmond
Rodrigo López-Orellana
University of Salamanca
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Juan Redmond
University of Valparaiso
Bio
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i60.1136

Published 2020-10-27

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How to Cite

López-Orellana, R., & Redmond, J. (2020). Dialogical Assertion as a Minimum Unit of Knowledge. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (60), 103–152. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i60.1136
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to propose the notion of dialogical assertion as a minimal unit of knowledge in the frame of dialogical pragmatism. We argue that this minimal unity is the dialogue for the p thesis, accompanied by its game of giving and asking for reasons (Play-Level) for a winning strategy for the proponent. Thereby, we explore the problem from the semantic framework proposed by Shahid Rahman to present a dialogical definition of that concept. Furthermore, we show how the notion of proposition ceases to be the primordial logical concept and how it is replaced by the notion of assertion as an act in the process of a dialogue game and following the fundamental insights of Brandom (1994, 2000) and Martin-Löf (1984). This pragmatic approach to logic will abandon the idea that the proposition is the minimum logical unit of true knowledge.

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