Articles
David Hume Versus Adam Smith: On the Source of Normativity in Moral Sentimentalism
Published 2020-06-27
How to Cite
Carrasco, M. A. (2020). David Hume Versus Adam Smith: On the Source of Normativity in Moral Sentimentalism. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (59), 341–366. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i59.1114
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Abstract
Despite the countless similarities between David Hume’s and Adam Smith’s moral theories, many people have lately argued that the Theory of Moral Sentiments can be read as a critical response to Hume’s ethics. In this paper I contend that the most important difference between these sentimentalist philosophers has to do with the source and nature of morality’s normative authority, which in turn determines what is a legitimate moral reason or what is morality properly speaking.
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