No. 59 (2020): Julio-diciembre
Articles

BEL or Bypass? Two Transparency Theories of Self-Knowledge

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  • Martin Francisco Fricke
Martin Francisco Fricke
Centro Peninsular en Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales (adscripción temporal)Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas (adscripción principal)Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i59.1101

Published 2020-06-27

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How to Cite

Fricke, M. F. (2020). BEL or Bypass? Two Transparency Theories of Self-Knowledge. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (59), 11–50. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i59.1101
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Abstract

Alex Byrne and Jordi Fernández propose two different versions of a transparency theory of self-knowledge. According to Byrne, we self-attribute beliefs by an inference from what we take to be facts about the world (following a rule he calls Bel). According to Fernández, we self-attribute the belief that p on the basis of a prior mental state, a state which constitutes our grounds for the belief that p (thereby realizing a procedure he calls Bypass). In this paper, I present the two theories in outline and discuss various objections concerning their normative (Can the procedure give us knowledge?) and metaphysical aspects (Is the procedure functional?). I conclude that especially the metaphysical objections against Bypass are somewhat more difficult to counter than those against Bel and that the modifications required of Fernández’s theory make it very similar to Byrne’s.

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