The Epistemic Intermediaries Argument
Daian Tatiana Flórez Quintero
Published 2020-06-27
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Abstract
Among his reasons to reject the thesis that perceptions can justify beliefs, Davidson claims that granting justificatory import to perceptions forces the empiricist to introduce epistemic intermediaries. Considering the variety of reasons that fall under this locution, I shall discuss them by what I propose to call the epistemic intermediaries argument. To determine how successful this argument can be against the most recent versions of empiricism, particularly McDowell’s theory of experience, I shall explain the notion of epistemic intermediation. I hold that despite the fact that the epistemic intermediaries argument seems to leave McDowell’s theory unharmed, if we accept the thesis that perceptions alone have justificatory capabilities, any version of empiricism faces two risks: it would either fail to block the possibility of skeptical scenarios or it would imply a return to coherentism.
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