Número 49 - 2015
Artículos

Excusas y eximientes

Publicado 2015-07-31

Cómo citar

Corral, M. del. (2015). Excusas y eximientes. Tópicos, (49), 231–256. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i49.706

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Resumen

Las excusas y las condiciones eximentes tienen como finalidad mitigar la responsabilidad. Este artículo propone una distinción entre excusas y eximentes basada en el tipo distintivo de juicio que cada una trata de responder. Argumento que los eximentes afectan la relevancia causal del acusado, mientras que las excusas lo justifican total o parcialmente, porque afectan al juicio evaluativo implícito en las atribuciones de responsabilidad. Esta distinción apoya una concepción de las atribuciones de responsabilidad como un proceso en dos etapas, donde cada una de ellas corresponde a un tipo diferente de responsabilidad (agencial y moral), cuya atribución está guiada por dos tareas cognitivas y argumentativas diferentes, aunque relacionadas: explicar lo que produjo una situación, y evaluar su significación moral.

 

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