Número 47 - 2014
Artículos

La dualidad del Problema de marco: Sobre interpretaciones y resoluciones

Publicado 2014-12-07

Cómo citar

Silenzi, M. I. (2014). La dualidad del Problema de marco: Sobre interpretaciones y resoluciones. Tópicos, (47), 89–112. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i47.663

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Resumen

El problema de marco, interpretado como un problema de determinación de la relevancia, ha sido motivo en las décadas de los 80 ́-90 ́ de grandes debates y controversias. La cuestión clave de este trabajo consistirá en dilucidar la relación que entre la dificultad definicional y resolutiva del problema de marco se establece: es necesario aclarar la interpretación particular que del problema de marco se tenga en mente antes de estimar cualquier solución que intente resolverlo. Una manera de abordar esta cuestión es describir algunas de las varias interpretaciones que del problema se han propuesto y analizar luego las dificultades subyacentes. Al igual que Lormand (1991) sugerimos que cada una de estas interpretaciones se refiere a un problema distinto y que es necesario atender a las diferencias que entre éstas se establecen antes de estimar cualquier propuesta de resolución.

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