Número 47 - 2014
Artículos

El caso Galileo o las Paradojas de una Racionalidad Científica Positivista según Paul Karl Feyerabend

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  • Teresa Gargiulo
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i47.662

Publicado 2014-12-07

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Gargiulo, T. (2014). El caso Galileo o las Paradojas de una Racionalidad Científica Positivista según Paul Karl Feyerabend. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (47), 53–88. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i47.662
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El caso Galileo significó para Feyerabend la oportunidad de mostrar metodológica e históricamente las paradojas y limitaciones de una noción positivista de ciencia. A través de este hecho paradigmático de la ciencia moderna el vienés demuestra las contradicciones que suponen los distintos intentos del neo-positivismo lógico por establecer un criterio de demarcación que defina qué es la ciencia. Da cuenta de cómo aquellos elementos frente a los cuales el positivismo lógico procura delimitar una definición negativa de ciencia, constituyen paradojalmente el seno del quehacer científico del físico. Ahora bien, esto no implica –tal como han señalado un número considerable de críticos– que Feyerabend sostenga una visión anárquica, irracionalista o relativista respecto a la ciencia. Por el contrario, en un sentido positivo se puede decir que el caso emblemático de Galileo no sólo le ofreció a Feyerabend la oportunidad de formular una argumentación negativa y escéptica respecto a aquella noción de ciencia sino que, al mismo tiempo, representó para él una ocasión para repensar la ciencia desde una perspectiva o una racionalidad científica más amplia.
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