Número 44 - 2013
Artículos

Reliabilism and Demon World Victims

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  • Jennifer Wilson Mulnix
Jennifer Wilson Mulnix
University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i44.2

Publicado 2013-09-30

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Mulnix, J. W. (2013). Reliabilism and Demon World Victims. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (44), 35–82. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i44.2
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En este trabajo se defiende el fiabilismo frente al experimento mental clásico del "genio maligno". Al hacerlo, enfatizo dos de sus supuestos clave; y después desarrollo una serie de variadas respuestas asequibles al fiabilista, mostrando que las mismas pueden ser útiles para explicar o negar las intuiciones iniciales de la propuesta del "genio maligno", de una manera consistente con el fiabilismo. Mi conclusión es que el experimento del "genio maligno" no socava  la fiablidad como el sello distintivo de la justificación epistémica.
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