Núm. 57 (2019): Julio-diciembre

El pasaje temporal: entre la física y la experiencia

Cristian López
Universidad de Buenos Aires Université de Lausanne CONICET

Publicado 2019-06-29

Cómo citar

López, C. (2019). El pasaje temporal: entre la física y la experiencia. Tópicos, (57), 45–86. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i57.1022


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En filosofía de la física y filosofía del tiempo existe una extendida tesis que afirma que nuestra experiencia del pasaje temporal es ilusoria, que no tiene correlato objetivo con el mundo natural de acuerdo a nuestras mejores teorías físicas. En particular, en la medida en que las leyes dinámicas de tales teorías son temporalmente simétricas y no permiten distinguir entre ambas direcciones temporales, la asimetría temporal experimentada debería ser considerada como algo puramente subjetivo. En este artículo argumentaré que tenemos sólidos motivos para poner en duda tal tesis. En primer lugar, no es claro en qué medida tenemos experiencia efectiva del pasaje temporal. En segundo lugar, es cuestionable que nuestras leyes dinámicas sean temporalmente simétrica, y que si lo fueran, que éstas sirvan como argumento en contra de una hipotética experiencia del pasaje temporal.


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