N.º 65 (2023): Enero - abril
Artículos

An Austinian Account of Knowledge Ascriptions

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  • Ignacio Vilaró
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v650.2061

Publicado 2022-12-02

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Vilaró, I. (2022). An Austinian Account of Knowledge Ascriptions. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (65), 49–87. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v650.2061

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Resumo

According to epistemic contextualism, the truth value of a knowledge ascription sentence varies in relation to the epistemic standard in play at its context of use. Contextualists promise a relatively conservative (dis)solution of the skeptical paradox that threatens to destroy our alleged everyday knowledge, based on our apparent inability to discard some exotic possibilities of error. The origins of the contextualist position have been traced back to some passages of Austin’s “Other Minds.” However, it is at best dubious whether the alternative there explored is indeed contextualist. Austin seems to be proposing a much more radical position, one still ignored in the literature. This paper aims to develop an Austinian approach to knowledge attributions. I show how we could use the Austinian account to solve this skeptical paradox. I also respond to some important objections to this view.

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Referências

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