No 68 (2024): Enero - abril
Artículos

Normativity and Pluralism in the Studies of Human Reasoning

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  • Alba Massolo
Alba Massolo
Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
DOI : https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v680.2438

Publiée 2023-12-07

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Massolo, A. (2023). Normativity and Pluralism in the Studies of Human Reasoning. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (68), 11–34. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v680.2438

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Résumé

En este artículo, abordo la disputa entre normativismo y descriptivismo centrándome en el problema del arbitraje. Para esto, propongo acercar a esta disputa la discusión sobre el problema del colapso que se ha dado recientemente en el marco de la filosofía de la lógica. Mi propuesta sostiene, por un lado, que el razonamiento humano, en cuanto práctica social, es una actividad esencialmente normada y, por otro lado, que los sistemas formales que se toman de referencia en la psicología del razonamiento son el resultado de diversos procesos de equilibrio reflexivo. Esto permite defender el rol normativo de los sistemas formales como estándar para el razonamiento humano. Además, sostengo que la adecuación de un sistema formal está signada por los contextos específicos de razonamiento. Así, defiendo un pluralismo normativo respecto de los sistemas formales de inferencia en el marco de los estudios empíricos sobre el razonamiento humano.

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