A Discussion on the Systematic Position of Kant´s Metaphysik der Sitten and Fichte´s Sittenlehre

Abstract

The systematic position of Kant´s Metaphysics of Morals and in particular of its second part, the Doctrine of Virtue, is analogue to the one of Fichte´s System of Ethics according to the Principles of the Doctrine of Science. However, in this book, Fichte criticizes Kant´s ethics as “formalist” and suggests that his own is more real and applicable, because of his theory on the conciliation between natural impulse and moral impulse. This article explains and discusses such thesis, and shows that this evaluation on Kant is unfair, because precisely on the Doctrine of Virtue, in a different methodic way —but soundly and coherently with the ethics of autonomy—, Kant develops his “material ethics”.