Número 26 - 2004
Articles

Common Sense in Saul Kripke as Method

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  • Carlos López Zaragoza
Carlos López Zaragoza
Universidad Panamericana
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v26i1.260

Published 2013-11-28

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How to Cite

Zaragoza, C. L. (2013). Common Sense in Saul Kripke as Method. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, 26(1), 67–98. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v26i1.260
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Abstract

This paper intends to show that the main goals of Saul Kripke's theory of reference depend on the methodological use of common sense, understanding by common sense the natural way in which intelligence approaches reality and in which is reflected in natural or ordinary language. The key to shed light on  Kripke's ideas about common sense is to analyze the texts in which he deals with 'intuition'.

 

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