Published 2022-12-02
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Abstract
The passage of “On Denoting” about Gray’s Elegy (PEG) is extremely obscure and has been the subject of many different interpretations. Apparently, it contains a devastating objection to the theory of denotative concepts that Russell himself had postulated in The Principles of Mathematics (PM) (1903). In this article we briefly expose this semantic theory, we examine in detail the passage in question, and we explore some of the interpretations that intend to unravel its meaning. With this we show, firstly, that this criticism is directed against the PM theory directly; secondly, that it is not possible to make a few homogeneous changes to enable a literal reading of the passage; finally, that although some of the arguments that the interpreters have argued to abandon the theory of denotative concepts are solid, it is not obvious that all of them are in PEG.
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