Número 44 - 2013
Articles

Reliabilism and Demon World Victims

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  • Jennifer Wilson Mulnix
Jennifer Wilson Mulnix
University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i44.2

Published 2013-09-30

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How to Cite

Mulnix, J. W. (2013). Reliabilism and Demon World Victims. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (44), 35–82. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i44.2
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Abstract

This paper defends reliabilism against the classic demon world victim thought experiment. In doing so, I underscore two of its key alleged intuitions. I then articulate a host of varied responses open to the reliabilist, arguing that these readily available responses provide the reliabilist with a way to either accommodate or reject these initial intuitions about the demon world victim thought experiment, and in a way consistent with reliabilism. Thus, I conclude that the demon world thought experiment does not undercut reliability as the hallmark of epistemic justification.

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