Número 36 - 2009
Articles

Deliberation and two concepts of mind

Published 2013-11-28

How to Cite

Grundy, W. (2013). Deliberation and two concepts of mind. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, 36(1), 161–170. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v36i1.132

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Abstract

The author considers the concept of deliberation as developed by Professor Martin Seel, and he tries to extract from that concept an underlying picture of mind. The author describes two pictures of mind that are historically and philosophically opposed. The first makes a sharp distinction between subject and object, and it construes experience in essentially epistemological terms. The second avoids sharp distinctions between subject and object, or between mind and world, and it construes experience in essentially practical terms. The author argues that there is significant evidence of both pictures in Professor Seel’s discussion of deliberation.

References

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  4. Taylor, C. (1985). Self-Interpreting Animals. En Philosophical Papers: Language and Human Agency. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  5. Wittgenstein, L. (1997). Philosophical Investigations. G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.) Oxford: Blackwell.