No. 60 (2021): January - June
Articles

A Genealogical Defense of Non-Purism in Epistemic Justification

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  • Florencia Rimoldi
Florencia Rimoldi
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i60.1139

Published 2020-10-27

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How to Cite

Rimoldi, F. (2020). A Genealogical Defense of Non-Purism in Epistemic Justification. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (60), 37–74. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i60.1139
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Abstract

In this work I propose and defend a non-purist conception of epistemic justification according to which the latter depends in part on non truth-conducive factors, such as the pragmatic context of people. To do so, I present three distinct perspectives on the notion of justified belief. In the first section I analyze the most salient aspects of the pre-theoretical notion. In the second section I defend a non-purist permisive view that recovers the elements of the pre-theoretic view in a theoretical manner and extends them towards non -purism. In the third section I defend this latter view by means of a genealogical account of the origin of the concept of justification.

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