Núm. 53 (2017): Julio-diciembre
Artículos

La composicionalidad del lenguaje revisitada

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  • Mariela Destefano
Mariela Destefano
Universidad de Buenos Aires Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Tecnológicas
Biografía

Publicado 2017-07-01

Palabras clave

  • lengua-I,
  • ensamble,
  • interfaz conceptual-intencional,
  • programa minimalista
Aviso de derechos de autor/a

Cómo citar

Destefano, M. (2017). La composicionalidad del lenguaje revisitada. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, 53, 51. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i53.844
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Resumen

En este trabajo intentaré mostrar que el lenguaje es composicional desde la perspectiva del programa minimalista. Desde este enfoque adoptaré la noción de “lengua-I”. Específicamente, intentaré sostener que, si el minimalismo es correcto, el producto de la lengua-I es composicional en virtud de restricciones generales de arquitectura cognitiva y restricciones intrínsecas al mecanismo computacional de la lengua-I. Mi argumento puede entenderse como una inferencia a la mejor explicación. La mejor explicación de que la lengua-I, en tanto sistema de expresiones que sirven de instrucciones semánticas para la interfaz conceptual-intencional, genere computacionalmente esas instrucciones y responda óptimamente a las condiciones de interfaz es, en parte, atribuyéndole composicionalidad semántica a dichas expresiones. 

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