N.º 64 (2022): Septiembre-diciembre
Artículos

Beyond Geach: A Place for Expressivisms

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  • José Andrés Forero-Mora
José Andrés Forero-Mora
Corporación Universitaria Minuto de Dios
##plugins.themes.classic.biography##
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v640.1970

Publicado 2022-08-13

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Forero-Mora, J. A. (2022). Beyond Geach: A Place for Expressivisms. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (64), 11–39. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v640.1970

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Este trabalho encontra-se publicado com a Licença Internacional Creative Commons Atribuição-NãoComercial-SemDerivações 4.0.

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Resumo

According to some contemporary philosophers of language, the Frege-Geach argument raises a genuine objection to semantic expressivism. In this paper it is argued that an effective way to confront and overcome this argument is by modifying the classical conception of expressivism. Both classical and minimal expressivisms are examined and a version of the latter is proposed. This version overcomes the objection derived from the Frege-Geach argument and has the advantage of including within the spectrum of expressionism theories that clearly have the same “spirit” but that the classical characterization leaves out.

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