N.º 61 (2021): Julio-diciembre
Artículos

The Suffering of Invertebrates: An Approach from Animal Ethics

PDF (English) XML (Español (España))
  • Alejandro Villamor Iglesias
Alejandro Villamor Iglesias
IES Carmen Martín Gaite (España)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i61.1197

Publicado 2021-06-23

Palavras-chave

Como Citar

Villamor Iglesias, A. (2021). The Suffering of Invertebrates: An Approach from Animal Ethics. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (61), 403–420. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i61.1197

Direitos de Autor (c) 2021 Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía

Creative Commons License

Este trabalho encontra-se publicado com a Licença Internacional Creative Commons Atribuição-NãoComercial-SemDerivações 4.0.

Downloads

Não há dados estatísticos.

Altmetrics

Citas

Crossref
Scopus
Google Scholar
Europe PMC

Resumo

Invertebrate animals are usually seen as a kind of “aliens” which do not deserve any moral consideration. However, there is a growing amount of evidence indicating that many of them do have the capacity to experience pain. The same criteria that are usually applied in order to infer that vertebrates are sentient beings (behavioral response, learning capacity, memory, a certain specific neurophysiological structure…) lead to the idea that many invertebrates are sentient as well. Therefore, under the skeptical premise that we have no direct evidence of the experience of pain in vertebrates, we are forced to hold that it exists in both vertebrates and invertebrates.

PDF (English) XML (Español (España))

Referências

  1. Allen, C. & Trestman, M. (2016 [1995]). Animal Consciousness. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. E. N. Zalta. (ed.). URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-animal/.
  2. Andrews, K. (2016 [2008]). Animal Cognition. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. E. N. Zalta. (ed.). URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cognition-animal/.
  3. Azevedo, F., Carvalho, L., Grinberg, L., Farfel, J. M., Ferretti, R., Leite, R., Filho, W. J., Lent, R. & Herculano-Houzel, S. (2009). Equal Numbers of Neuronal and Nonneuronal Cells Make the Human Brain an Isometrically Scaled-up Primate Brain. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 513, 532-541.
  4. Barron, A. & Klein, C. (2016a). Insects Have the Capacity for Subjective Experience. Animal Sentience, 100.
  5. Barron, A. & Klein, C. (2016b). What Insects Can Tell Us About the Origins of Consciousness. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113, 4900-4908.
  6. Bateson, P. (1991). Assessment of Pain in Animals. Animal Behaviour, 42, 827-839.
  7. Bernstein, M. (1998). On Moral Considerability: An Essay on Who Morally Matters. Oxford University Press.
  8. Block, N. (1991). Evidence against Epiphenomenalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 14, 670-672.
  9. Broom, D. M. (2013). The Welfare of Invertebrate Animals such as Insects, Spiders, Snails and Worms. In A. van der Kemp & M. Lachance (eds.), Animal Suffering: From Science to Law, International Symposium. (pp. 135-152). Éditions Yvon Blais.
  10. Carere, C., Wood, J. B. & Mather, J. (2011). Species Differences in Captivity: Where are the Invertebrates? Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 26, 211.
  11. Carruthers, P. (2007). Invertebrate Minds: A Challenge for Ethical Theory. The Journal of Ethics, 11, 275-297. Cavalieri, P. (2001). The Animal Question: Why Nonhuman Animals Deserve Human Rights. Oxford University Press.
  12. Chittka, L. & Niven, J. (2009). Are Bigger Brains Better? Current biology, 19, R995-R1008.
  13. Crook, R. J. & Walters E. T. (2011). Nociceptive Behavior and Physiology of Molluscs: Animal Welfare Implications. ILAR Journal, 52, 185–195.
  14. Damasio, A. (1999). The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. Harcourt Inc.
  15. Damasio, A. & Carvalho, G. B. (2013). The Nature of Feelings: Evolutionary and Neurobiological Origins. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 14, 143-152.
  16. Darwin, C. (1871). The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex. John Murray.
  17. Dawkins, M. S. (2001). Who Needs Consciousness? Animal Welfare, 10, 19-29.
  18. Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Little, Brown and Company.
  19. Dunayer, J. (2004). Speciesism. Ryce.
  20. Elwood, R. W. (2011). Pain and Suffering in Invertebrates? Institute of Laboratory Animal Resources Journal, 52, 175-184.
  21. Elwood, R. W., Barr, S. & Patterson, L. (2009). Pain and Stress in Crustaceans? Applied Animal Behaviour Science, 118, 128–136.
  22. Faria, C. (2016). Animal Ethics Goes Wild: The Problem of Wild Animal Suffering and Intervention in Nature.(Doctoral Dissertation). Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  23. Feinberg, T. E. & Mallatt, J. M. (2016). The Ancient Origins of Consciousness: How the Brain Created Experience. MIT Press.
  24. Francione, G. (2000). Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog? Temple University Press.
  25. Frijda, N. H. (1988). The Laws of Emotion. American psychologist, 43, 349-358.
  26. Griffin, J. (1979). Is Unhappiness Morally More Important than Happiness? The Philosophical Quarterly, 29, 47-55.
  27. Horta, O. (2010a). Disvalue in Nature and Intervention: The Fox, the Rabbit and the Vegan Food Rations. Pensata Animal, 34.
  28. Horta, O. (2010b). What is Speciesism? Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 23, 243-266.
  29. Horta, O. (2015). The Problem of Evil in Nature: Evolutionary Bases of the Prevalence of Disvalue. Relations. Beyond Anthropocentrism, 3, 17-32.
  30. Horvath, K., Angeletti, D., Nascetti, G. & Carere, C. (2013). Invertebrate Welfare: An Overlooked Issue. Annali dell’Istituto Superiore di Sanità, 49, 9–17.
  31. Hyslop, A. (2014 [2005]). Other Minds. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. E. N. Zalta. (ed.). URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/other-minds/.
  32. Kavaliers, M., Hirst, M., & Teskey, G. C. (1983). A Functional Role for an Opiate System in Snail Thermal Behavior. Science, 220, 99-101.
  33. Knutsson, S. (2015). The Moral Importance of Invertebrates such as Insects. (Master’s thesis). University of Gothenburg.
  34. Knutsson, S. (2016). Reducing Suffering among Invertebrates such as Insects. Sentience Politics. URL: https://sentience-politics.org/research/policypapers/invertebrate-suffering/.
  35. Lockwood, J. (1987). The Moral Standing of Insects and the Ethics of Extinction. The Florida Entomologist, 70, 70-89.
  36. Lockwood, J. (1988). Not to Harm a Fly: Our Ethical Obligations to Insects. Between the Species, 4, 204-211.
  37. Lockwood, J. (2014). Jeffrey Lockwood on Insect Suffering. An interview by Max Maxwell Brian Carpendale. Essays on Reducing Suffering. URL: http://reducing-suffering.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/lockwoodinsect-suffering.pdf.
  38. Longueira, A. (2011). El sufrimiento animal y la extinción. Ágora: Papeles de filosofía, 30, 43-56.
  39. Mashour, G. A., & Alkire, M. T. (2013). Evolution of Consciousness: Phylogeny, Ontogeny, and Emergence from General Anesthesia. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110, 10357-10364.
  40. Mather, J. A. (2001). Animal Suffering: An Invertebrate Perspective. Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science, 4, 151-156.
  41. Menzel, R. & Giurfa, M. (2001). Cognitive Architecture of a Mini-Brain: The Honeybee. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5, 62-71.
  42. Menzel, R., Greggers, U., Smith, A., Berger, S., Brandt, R., Brunke, S., Bundrock, G., Hülse, S., Plümpe, T., Schaupp, F., Schüttler, E., Stach, S., Stindt, J., Stollhoff, N. & Watzl, S. (2005). Honey Bees Navigate According to a Map-like Spatial Memory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 102, 3040-3045.
  43. Merker, B. (2007). Consciousness without a Cerebral Cortex: A Challenge for Neuroscience and Medicine. Behavioral and brain sciences, 30, 63-81.
  44. Morton, D. B. & Hau, J. (2002). Welfare Assessment and Humane Endpoints. In J. Hau & G. L. van Hoosier (eds.), Handbook of Laboratory Animal Science. Volume I: Essential Principles and Practices. (pp. 457–486). CRC Press.
  45. Nagel, T. (1974). What Is It Like to Be a Bat? The Philosophical Review, 83, 435-450.
  46. Ng, Y.-K. (1995). Towards Welfare Biology: Evolutionary Economics of Animal Consciousness and Suffering. Biology and Philosophy, 10, 255-285.
  47. Paulk, A. C., Stacey, J. A., Pearson, T. W., Taylor, G. J., Moore, R. J., Srinivasan, M. V. & Van Swinderen, B. (2014). Selective Attention in the Honeybee Optic Lobes Precedes Behavioral Choices. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111, 5006-5011.
  48. Pearce, D. (2010). Why Be Negative? The Hedonistic Imperative. URL: https://www.hedweb.com/negutil.htm.
  49. Pluhar, E. (1995). Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman Animals. Duke University Press.
  50. Regan, T. (1983). The Case for Animal Rights. University of California Press.
  51. Rollin, B. (1998). The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain, and Science. Iowa State University Press.
  52. Sapontzis, S. (1987). Moral, Reason, and Animals. Temple University Press.
  53. Sherwin, C. M. (2001). Can Invertebrates Suffer? Or, How Robust is Argument-by-Analogy? Animal Welfare, 10 (supplement), 103-118.
  54. Singer, P. (1975). Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals. Random House.
  55. Smith, J. A. (1991). A Question of Pain in Invertebrates. Institute for Laboratory Animal Research Journal, 33, 25-32.
  56. Sømme, L. S. (2005). Sentience and Pain in Invertebrates. Report to Norwegian Scientific Committee for Food Safety. URL: https://www.seafoodnews.com/news/images/norwegianinvertebrate.pdf.
  57. Tomasik, B. (2016a [2015]). Are Happiness and Suffering Symmetric? Essays on Reducing Suffering. URL: http://reducing-suffering.org/happiness-suffering-symmetric/.
  58. Tomasik, B. (2016b). Insect Suffering from Silk, Shellac, Carmine, and Other Insect Products. Essays on Reducing Suffering. URL: http://reducingsuffering.org/insect-suffering-silk-shellac-carmine-insect-products/.
  59. Tomasik, B. (2016c). The Cruelty of Eating Snails. Essays on Reducing Suffering. URL: http://reducing-suffering.org/cruelty-eating-snails/.
  60. Tomasik, B. (2016d [2015]). The Importance of Insect Suffering. Essays on Reducing Suffering. URL: http://reducing-suffering.org/the-importance-ofinsect-suffering/.
  61. Tracey, D. W., Wilson, R. I., Laurent, G. & Benzer, S. (2003). painless, a Drosophila Gene Essential for Nociception. Cell, 113, 261-273.
  62. Walter, S. (1983). Animal Thought. Routledge & Kegan Paul. Wigglesworth, V. B. (1980). Do Insects Feel Pain? Antenna, 4, 8-9.
  63. Wittenburg, N. & Baumeister, R. (1999). Thermal Avoidance in Caenorhabditis elegans: An Approach to the Study of Nociception. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 96, 10477-10482.
  64. Yarali, A., Niewalda, T., Chen, Y.-C., Tanimoto, H., Duerrnagel, S., & Gerber, B. (2008). Pain Relief Learning in Fruit Flies. Animal Behaviour, 76, 1173-1185.
  65. Zheng, X., Zhang, D., Li, Y., Yang, C., Wu, Y., Liang, X., Liang, Y., Pan, X., Hu, L., Sun, Q., Wang, X., Wei, Y., Zhu, J., Qian, W., Yan, Z., Parker, A. G., Gilles, J. R. L., Bourtzis, K., Bouyer, J., Tang, M., Zheng, B., Yu, J., Liu, J., Zhuang, J., Hu, Z., Zhang, M., Gong, J.-T., Hong, X.-Y., Zhang, Z., Lin, L., Liu, Q., Hu, Z., Wu, Z., Baton, L. A., Hoffmann, A. A. & Xi, Z. (2019). Incompatible and Sterile Insect Techniques Combined Eliminate Mosquitoes. Nature, 572, 56-61.