N. 70 (2024): Septiembre-diciembre
Artículos

Rawlsianism and What Is Urgent

Pubblicato 2024-08-15

Come citare

Camacho-Beltrán, E. (2024). Rawlsianism and What Is Urgent. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (70), 39–70. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v700.2663

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Abstract

In Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Rawls asserted that his conception of justice should provide guidance for a non-ideal theory of real-world injustices. Nonetheless, he established at the same time an enigmatic limit to his framing in which neither political philosophy nor justice as fairness should be understood as applied approaches. It is unclear how guidance against real-world injustices is possible, since it would presumably require insights into applied ethics. This paper focuses on drafting a possible alternative by offering a partially comprehensive reconstruction of the reasonable as a virtue. The hope is to use the virtue of reasonable citizens to transfer Rawlsian ponderations into a special kind of applied ethics controversies concerned with urgent public debates and resistance politics. The idea of this construction is to allow the virtue of the reasonable to establish a standard for citizen conduct.

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