N. 64 (2022): Septiembre-diciembre
Artículos

Sharing a Boundary at the Same Time: A Discussion about Material Collocation and Four-Dimensionalism

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  • Gonzalo Nuñez Erices
Gonzalo Nuñez Erices
Universidad Católica del Maule
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v640.1983

Pubblicato 2022-08-13

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Nuñez Erices, G. (2022). Sharing a Boundary at the Same Time: A Discussion about Material Collocation and Four-Dimensionalism. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (64), 41–77. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v640.1983

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Abstract

Is it possible for two material objects to share the very same boundary? Material collocation is a metaphysical thesis that allows for two qualitatively distinct objects to share the same boundary of a matter-filled region of space and, therefore, to be made of the same stuff despite them differing in some metaphysical respects (e.g., temporal or modal properties). This article addresses the metaphysical implications of material collocation on a boundary account and how things persist across time. It discusses endurantism and perdurantism in terms of boundaries: while the former postulates physical objects as entities having boundaries along the three spatial dimensions, the latter postulates them as entities having boundaries along four dimensions, considering time as an extra dimension. Finally, the article raises two criticisms against perdurantism: one related to Heller’s commitment to boundary essentialism of four-dimensional objects, and the other to the resemblance argument between spatial and temporal boundaries.

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