N. 62 (2022): Gennaio - Aprile
Artículos

La evolución del juicio moral. Una explicación funcional plural

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  • Víctor Emilio Parra Leal
Víctor Emilio Parra Leal
Universidad Nacional de Colombia
Biografia
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v62i0.1233

Pubblicato 2021-12-11

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Parra Leal, V. E. (2021). La evolución del juicio moral. Una explicación funcional plural. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (62), 315–347. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v62i0.1233

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Abstract

Las teorías funcionales evolutivas de la moral asumen que la moral ha sido seleccionada evolutivamente por su efecto de lograr un comportamiento cooperativo y prosocial (explicación funcional del efecto seleccionado, ES). Esta asunción implica incorrectamente que se conoce el rasgo o rasgos que conforman la moral. Adicionalmente, la teoría funcional ES no parece dar cuenta de las particularidades del pensamiento moral, las cuales se sintetizan principalmente en las características que se le atribuyen al juicio moral, a saber, su autoridad e inevitabilidad (fuerza práctica). Este artículo plantea una explicación ES alternativa y argumenta que también se requiere de una explicación funcional del rol causal (RC), la cual muestra cómo se integra el efecto seleccionado con ciertas tendencias evaluativas básicas humanas, lo que permite dar cuenta de la fuerza práctica del juicio moral y de fenómenos como la ambivalencia moral. Queda sin explicar cuál es el rol que juegan la razón y las emociones en la formulación del juicio moral.

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