No. 71 (2025): Enero-abril
Articles

The Scope of Presentist Objections to Longtermism

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  • Dayrón Terán
Dayrón Terán
Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v710.2848

Published 2024-12-17

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Terán, D. (2024). The Scope of Presentist Objections to Longtermism. Tópicos, Revista De Filosofía, (71), 363–383. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v710.2848

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Abstract

Most of the individuals that will ever exist in history will probably do so in the distant future. If our decisions can influence the wellbeing of these individuals, it seems plausible to claim that there are reasons to be morally concerned about the long-term future. The view that supports this claim is known as longtermism. However, if—as deontic presentism holds—the interests of these individuals matter less, or do not matter at all, it could be argued that it is irrelevant how many people could exist in the future, since we would have reasons to prioritize those who live in the present. This paper examines the extent to which presentism raises an objection to longtermism.

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